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Abstract: The customary way of interpreting the dialogue between Arjuna and 
Kṛṣṇa in the Bhagavad-Gita is to consider it merely as an expression of the fear of 
the diffident Arjuna, who is depicted by almost all the commentators as being 
scared of fighting the battle, and Kṛṣṇa’s ingenuous solution to it. This paper 
argues that this common way of looking at the conflict leaves the central theme of 
the debate unattained and unsolved. The debate can also be viewed as a statement 
of the confrontation between two ethics and two notions of the self. The claim is not 
that the customary interpretation is false, or that the present one is the only 
possible interpretation. It rather makes a much moderate claim that it is possible to 
give the text an alternative reading, which sheds some light on the nature of Indian 
ethics as such. It is long debated as to whether India had ever had an ethics. This 
paper claims to give some insight into the debate. 
 
THE BHAGAVAD-GITA being the repository of the mainstream Indian ethics 
deserves special attention of anyone who is interested in the subject. It is debatable 
whether India had ever had an ethics, which, as it is ordinarily understood, is the 
study of the norms of conduct and their justification. It tries to discover, and 
sometimes invent, what is right and what is wrong, but always with some 
justification. Whether or not India had an ethics depends on what counts as an ethical 
justification. If mythological explanation together with testimony of reliable persons 
or revelation is to be counted as a valid source of justification, then India did have an 
ethics. Both in India and abroad ethics for several centuries derived its justification 
from religious and mythological sources. All religious texts have an ethics in this 
sense. What is written in the textbooks of Indian ethics are mostly a set of rules of 
human conduct. These rules are often collected from various law books like 
Manusaṁhitā, Parāśrasaṁhitā, etc. These texts provide us with some mythical story 
about genesis and also about the origin of these texts, which are claimed to be 
revelations to the ancient seers who percolated their wisdom, through their disciples, 
for the benefit of mankind.  This provides us with a ground for following the norms 
stated in those texts. Once we accept this story of genesis, these norms become 
compelling for us, since these norms come directly from God, who created this 
universe with all its life-forms. So, it may be urged, the claim that Indian ethics does 
not provide justification in support of the norms prescribed in it, does not stand. But 
modern ethics after the enlightenment has never relied upon myths or revelation for 
justifying the theories proposed in it. Ethics, as construed in the contemporary 
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Western thought, is a normative study of human conduct. It studies the righteousness 
and wrongness of human action and those of the norms guiding such conduct. But 
what is noticeable here is that the mere study of those conducts and the norms guiding 
them was never considered as ethics. It also requires some justification in support of 
those norms or the criterion (or criteria) validating those norms. In this sense it can be 
doubted whether India had ever had an ethics. This is not to claim that “ethics” 
cannot, or does not, have any other connotation. At the same time it must also be 
noted that this is one of the predominant, and philosophically interesting, senses of 
the term.  
Taken in a wider sense, however, as the study of human conduct, India definitely 
had an ethics. The study of morality can be viewed from two different perspectives—
first from the perspective of prescribing norms and providing justification for them, 
and second, from the perspective of describing the norms of the society we live in. 
The second perspective assumes that we live in a justice based society and, hence, we 
need not revise the norms of conduct prevalent in our society. The reason is that if 
justice is there, or if it has already been established in the society, then we need not 
set norms to establish or reestablish it, provided that a justice bases society is our 
goal. We bring about changes in, or seek to change, our social norms, where we find 
the existing norms to be deficient. On the other hand, if we confine the task of ethics 
just to describing the prevalent norms of the society and claim that there is no need to 
change those norms, we thereby assume that the existing norms can, at least 
potentially, establish justice. If description of norms of human conduct is to be 
considered as the task of ethics, then India did definitely have its ethics. 
 The traditional Indian society was considered to be a justice-based society, 
though the concept of justice was strikingly different from that advocated by the 
Western ethicists. Equality had never been a guiding principle of justice in India. 
Rather, the Indian ethics can be regarded as an ethics based on the principle of 
inequality. It holds that people situated differently due to their social and sexual 
identity deserve to be treated differently and have different ethical responsibility from 
the ethical perspective. It may not be as grotesque, as it appears to be, if we consider 
that in any hierarchical social order some people within the family have more ethical 
rights and higher responsibility than the other members. A naturalized from of ethics 
may confine itself to merely describing those norms.  
The Gītā stands at the crossroad of Indian ethics. We find in the text many things 
that mark its difference from the ethical texts written earlier. Though the ethical 
implications of the philosophies of the Upaniṣad-s can be discerned by any serious 
scholar of the Veda-s, it is for the first time in the history of Indian ethics that we find 
in the Gītā a systematic attempt of justifying ethical claims on philosophical grounds.  
The Gītā raises the “why” question at the ethical sphere and tries to answer it in 
metaphysical terms. Thus ethics becomes supervenient on metaphysics. Second, the 
Gītā rebels against the earlier Vedic ritualism (karmakāṇḍa) and argues in support of 
the need for assimilating wisdom (jñāna), action (karman) and devotion (bhakti) for 
performing the right action.  Vedic ritualism may be viewed as a sophisticated form of 
black-magic and has very little to do with ethics as the study of social conduct of 
human beings. It gives us only some imperatives for performing sacrifices (yajña-s), 
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which lead to some mundane gain (abhyudaya), like having more cattle, or some 
transcendental goal (nihśreyasa), viz. liberation. Such imperatives can hardly explain 
why a course of action is to be undertaken within a just society. Third, as against the 
consequentialist ethical practices of the Vedic cult it advocates deontologism, though 
at places we find verses, which indicate toward consequentialism. Kṛṣṇa urged, “O 
Conqueror of wealth (Arjuna) mere action is inferior to the practice of intelligence. 
Take recourse to intelligence. Those, who perform their action for the attainment of 
the desired goals, are weak (in character).”1  
The Gītā rightly points out that consequentialism advocates that our ethical 
practices should depend on our self-interest, and hence, it argues that it cannot be a 
proper guiding force for our ethical action. It also needs to be noted that personal 
liberty, which is considered to be one main objective of the entire Western ethics, had 
never been on the agenda for the Indian ethicist. Personal liberty in ethics and 
individualism in politics go hand in hand, one complimenting the other. The basic 
presupposition is that individuals living in societies have a separate existence 
conceptually prior to that of the society they live in. So, the domain of individual 
liberty is sacrosanct and should not be intervened by the society. The society reserves 
the right to interfere into one’s personal liberty only if the enjoyment of such so-
called individual rights hinders others from enjoying their rights. Thus on this view 
the individuals are given supreme autonomy of will over and above the society. This 
supreme autonomy helps the individual develop her personality and also acts as an 
incentive towards the development of the society. Indian ethics, on the other hand, 
takes an organismic approach to the society and the individuals living in it. Just as the 
limbs of a person cannot be considered in isolation from the body the individual lives 
in and for the society. The individual can enjoy autonomy only within the restrictive 
and regulative norms of the society. These norms have been codified in the sacred law 
books, such as Manusmṛti. The purpose of a woman’s life, for example, is to help 
man attaining his mundane goal, like producing a male child to get the family lineage 
going. Since she lives for the society, she is morally obliged to perform her societal 
duty as a mother, or a wife. She has no right to decide what to do and what not to do. 
She enjoys freedom only to the extent to which she can decide when to do it or how to 
do it. Similarly, a man is obliged to perform the duties assigned to him on the basis of 
the caste he belongs to and the stage of his life he is going through. Everything, 
including his occupation, or the type of partner that he should take in his life, is thus 
predetermined to a great extent. He doesn’t have freedom to select his mate from any 
caste of his choice, though within the suitable caste he is free to select his bride, 
subject to the approval of his family. Neither is he free to choose his own calling.   
The type of liberty and autonomy that was presupposed in modern Western ethics 
cannot be witnessed in Indian ethics, as moral agents have been ascribed only a 
limited autonomy in it. Autonomy and personal liberty are thought to be subservient 
to the social order in the Indian context. As we have already noted, the traditional 
Indian societies were guided by social norms later on codified by various law-makers 
                                                 
1Dureṇa hi avaraṁ karma buddhiyogāt dhanañjaya/ 
Buddhau śaraṇam anviccha kṛpaṇāh  phalahetavaḥ//  Bhagavdgītā, 2/49. 
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including Manu, Parāśara and Gautama. According to this approach, human beings 
can enjoy freedom to the extent to which the society ascribe it to them, and which has 
no discord with the social order.  Indian ethics believes that rights and duties should 
depend on and be proportionate to one’s station and social status. Individuals have the 
freedom of will and autonomy only in the restricted sense of enjoying one’s rights and 
performing ones duties according to one’s social position determined primarily by 
birth. This autonomy may be called as subservient autonomy as opposed to the 
supreme autonomy presupposed in the mainstream Western ethics. We shall see that 
the dialogue between Arjuna and Kṛṣṇa raises the question of autonomy in a 
significant way. 
Two types of duties are ascribed to individuals in Indian ethics—universal duties 
(sāmānya dharma/sādhāraṇa dharma) and particular duties (viśeṣa dharma). 
Absolute duties are those which are incumbent on the individual irrespective of 
his/her sex, birth and social status. Duties like nonviolence and truthfulness are 
supposed to be performed by everybody under all circumstances. Particular duties, on 
the other hand, depend on the position of the moral agent in the hierarchy of the social 
order depending on sex, birth and age of the moral agent. For example, the duty of a 
warrior is to protect the clan and to rule it. The rights and duties of a priest are to 
study and teach the Veda-s and to conduct and perform religious rites. It is noticeable 
that from the later Vedic era women had little autonomy, and consequently, had a 
very limited moral agency. The same is true about the other marginalized groups. The 
entire edifice of the hierarchy of duties (dharma-s) follows from scriptures in the 
Vedic tradition. No further justification is needed, since the scriptures are claimed to 
be incorrigible. Duties in this tradition have been defined as injunctions (of 
scriptures). Kṛṣṇa urged Arjuna to perform his duties. Now, which duty Kṛṣṇa was 
talking about? It is noticeable that Kṛṣṇa was asking Arjuna to perform his particular 
duty, i.e. his duty as a warrior, at the cost of not observing some of his specific duties, 
e.g. non-violence. 
The dharmaśāstra-s contained very little or no discussion of normative ethics. 
They contained laws, including moral injunctions, governing all aspects of human 
life. The Mahābhārata, and the Gītā in particular, is perhaps the only major work 
where an explicit normative theory has been developed. The line of argumentation 
with the help of which the main doctrine has been justified in the Gītā is metaphysical 
in nature. However, an argument in support of the metaphysical basis on which the 
main line of argumentation depends is perspicuous in its absence in the text. We have 
to keep in mind that the Mahābhārata is an orthodox text. Anything that is supported 
by the Veda-s needs no further justification. The argumentative part of the Gītā is thus 
marked by the existence of different moral voices in the heterogeneous Indian society. 
Working within the bounds of the orthodox forms of life the dharmaśāstra-s 
presupposed that the existing societies to be more or less justice-based societies and 
are conducive to ethical good. We will argue that the Gītā is a major departure from 
this tradition. 
The mainstream Western ethics presupposes a particular notion of the self. The 
entire ethical tradition of the West, as well as India, is parasitic upon the notion of the 
self. In the mainstream Western tradition moral agency is ascribed to an autonomous 
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and detached self, which can take independent decisions. By the expression 
‘independent decision’ here we mean decisions that are not permeated by passions 
and are not influenced by the context in which it is taken. This moral agent is a pure 
form devoid of any content. No relation can move him, no emotion can touch him, 
and the flesh fails in its beastly endeavor of swallowing up its unambiguous 
rationality, which is so translucent that like a prism analyzing colors of a ray of light, 
it separates shades of virtues from those of vices of human conduct. 
Here is a story, rather a thought experiment, of an autombie and a senti. They 
were not actual human beings, but looked like them. The autombie had a set of 
exclusive rules to guide its conduct. It was autonomous and unlike an ordinary 
zombie it was not controlled by any external agent, it was created by some external 
agent though. It had the intention of following rules and could report exactly its 
internal ‘mental’ states, including its intentions. The senti was a fleshy beast having 
no rules of conduct. Instinctive drive and gut feeling are the sole factors with the help 
of which it could assess a situation and decided a course of action. Both the senti and 
the autombie worked for a humanitarian organization as medical personnel in a war 
ravaged city of Afghanistan. The autombie had no facial expression of emotions. The 
senti, on the other hand, was full of emotions and that was expressed in its facial 
expression. The autombie used to distribute medicines among the patients of a local 
hospital and senti had the duty entrusted on it of doing beds of the patients. Both of 
them spent most of the money they earned on doing some good to the patients, like 
buying gifts for them. The autombie did it dispassionately, while the senti lacking 
reason did it by a gut feeling. 
One elderly lady patient, Umbalica, loved both of them. The senti’s passionate 
eyes reminded her of her twenty-two year old daughter, whom she had lost along with 
her entire family in an air attack roughly one year back. Rather than resembling the 
aid providers, the autombie’s expressionless face and frigid movements resembled 
more closely with those of the inmates of the hospital. So, she could identify herself 
with the autombie more easily than with anyone else. She would wake up early in the 
morning and wait for them to come in the ward. The autombie was as punctual as was 
unerring about its duties. It would approach each bed, say, “Good morning!” wait for 
a reply, acknowledge it, pass the prescribed medicine on to the patient and then move 
on to the next bed. This entire act would roughly take two minutes for each bed. 
When the autombie is done with distributing medicines, it would return to its 
chamber. Umbalica often thought of asking the autombie about the incident that she 
thought had turned it into a piece of stone. The senti was often late at attending 
patients. It would spend some time at each bed, talk to them, take care of their 
individual needs, and then move on to the next bed. Soon it developed a personal 
relationship with each of them. 
The day was exactly one year after Umbalica lost her family and she was 
extremely depressed. In the morning the autombie came to her bed, looked at her, 
checked her temperature and, as usual, moved on to the next bed after administering 
the prescribed medicine. Umbalica’s helpless eyes had no effect on it, and it couldn’t 
understand her mental condition. Nor it was requires to understand that, as it was not 
a psychiatrist. A little later the senti came to her. It looked into her eyes intensely. 
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With its gut sense it could gauge the turmoil that was going on in her mind. It said 
nothing, just sat beside her holding her hand. Umbalica asked the senti if it were 
being late in attending other patients and reminded that it might be scolded by the 
ward mistress afterwards. The senti politely replied, ‘Heavens will not fall if I attend 
other patients a little later. I want to spend some time with you now. Besides, I’m 
quite used to her scolding. You don’t have to be bothered about that. I can manage 
such situations.’ 
It is quite clear from the story that the autombie was more dutiful than the senti 
and followed the principle of equality religiously. But the question still remains who 
was a better creature from the moral perspective?  
Every moral agent has in herself an autombie and a fleshy beast. Depending on 
their respective theories of the self Arjuna and Kṛṣṇa assessed the war situation 
differently. 
The Gītā deviates to a great extent from the mainstream Indian ethics in that it 
clearly propagates a theory of a detached self in support of the ethical doctrines 
advocated in it. The self in its pure form, as has been claimed, is devoid of all 
relations and is not permeated by passions and relations that infuse the mundane 
existence. Detachment of the self from its other has been proposed for the ascetic in 
the Indian ethics right from the days of the Upanisad-s. Perhaps, it was for the first 
time in the Gītā that it was proposed for the ordinary human beings as well.  Kṛṣṇa 
urged in the Gīta,  
 
Vāsāṁsi jīrnāni yathā vihāya navāni gṛhnāti naro’parāṇi/ 
Tathā śarīrāṇi vihāya jīrnānyanyāni saṁyāti navāni dehī//2/22// 
 
Just as human beings change worn-out cloths and put on others that are new, the soul 
changes its abode and takes a new one after the former gets old. It can better be 
explained with the allegory of a snake casting off its skin. The relation between the 
self and the body is similar to that of a snake and its slough, the only difference being 
unlike the serpent the self is not perishable. 
 
              Nainaṁ chindanti śastrāṇi nainaṁ dahati pāvakaḥ/ 
Na chainaṁ kledayantyāpo na śoṣayati mārutaḥ// (Bhagavdgītā, 2/23) 
 
Swords cannot shred it, fire cannot burn it, water cannot drench it, nor can wind make 
it dry. 
At the beginning of the first day’s battle seeing his friends and relative Arjuna, on 
the other hand, stated his predicament in the following verses: 
 
Dṛṣṭvemaṁ svajanaṁ  yuytsaṁ samupasthitam / 
Sīdanti mama gātrāṇī mukhañca pariśuṣyati//1/28/ 
Vepathuśca śarīre me romaharṣaśca jayate/ 
Gāṇḍīva sraṁsate hastat tvak chaiva paridahyate//1/29/ 
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 “When I see my own people arrayed and eager for fight… [m]y limbs quail, my 
mouth goes dry, my body shakes and my hair stands on end.”2 
 Kṛṣṇa interpreted Arjuna’s predicament as the latter’s fear of fighting the battle. 
But if the arguments that would be presented in this paper were sound, then the 
attempt of discarding his arguments as frivolous would be besieged by doubt. 
Arjuna raised a few serious questions with regard to Hindu ethics. He could see 
no mundane good, as attaining pleasure, in killing his rivals, who happened to be his 
near and dear ones. He tried to convince that (even on the injunctions of the sacred 
text) killing an assassin would still invite sin on part of the retaliator. Apparently, he 
doubted the acceptability of a retributive theory of punishment, one of the principal 
theoretical bases of a just war. He wondered whether an-eye for-an-eye mode of 
punishment could bring about justice and the ultimate triumph of good over evil. This 
appears to be a serious question, which cannot possibly be answered simply by 
referring to the testimonial evidences that goes against it. Two reasons can be cited 
for this claim. First, Arjuna’s position is also supported by textual evidence. As in 
Udyogaparva, 38, 73, 74 of the Mahābhārata, it is said, “conquer anger by non-
anger, conquer dishonesty by honesty, conquer a miser by gifts; conquer falsehood 
with truth.”3 Arjuna, however, didn’t give any testimonial evidence in support of his 
claim. One reason why he didn’t quote any text in his support was probably that he 
knew that an equal number of textual evidences might be cited against his argument. 
And the stronger reason was that it was the very same texts whose authority he was 
trying to challenge by his arguments. Quoting those very texts whose authority he was 
challenging might have made his position more vulnerable to adverse criticism. He 
made two points clear in his argument. First, he did not endorse the theoretical basis 
of a just war and second, he thought that moral prescriptions arising out of a concept 
of a related self would be markedly different from those based on the concept of an 
unrelated self. It was for the first time in his life that he got the insight that the 
concept of an unrelated self is a chimera, which led one nowhere, neither to his 
earthly wellbeing nor to any ethical good. He used the expression “my own people” 
(svajanam) four times in the first chapter of the Gītā. His arguments started at verse 
28 of the first chapter of the text, where he reported that seeing his own people in the 
opposite side his body ached, and his mouth went dry. This first expression was a 
sudden outburst of emotion. Kṛṣṇa, who was a staunch supporter of the 
reason/emotion binary, developed his main line of argument on this statement. 
Seeing his beloved and respected ones on the opposite side Arjuna became full of 
compassion and said, “my mind is reeling [from the path of the received knowledge 
of right and wrong]. I see the act of killing my own people to be the causes of 
producing results that are detrimental to good and righteousness. Nor do I see 
anything ethically desirable (śreyo) can be produced by killing my own people.”  
                                                 
2Radhakrishnan, S., The Bhagavadgita, HarperCollins Publishers India, New Delhi, 2004, p. 
89. 
3Akrodhena jayet krodham, asādhuṁ sādhunā jayet/ 
Jayet kadaryaṁ dānena, jayet satyena cānṛtam// Udyogaparva, 38, 73, Mahābhārata. 
82 PROYASH SARKAR 
 
Journal of East-West Thought 
 
 
Nowhere in the Gītā was it said that Arjuna was afraid of fighting the battle 
because of his own life. He was rather worried for the lives of his friends and 
relatives. Instead of seeing this emotion as a virtue of his character Kṛṣṇa considered 
it to be a weakness, which would lead Arjuna to the hell at the end. He (Kṛṣṇa), 
rather, endorsed the path of persuasion. He himself was convinced at the fairness of 
the ensuing war and was not open to any argument whatsoever. He wondered how 
Arjuna, who was an Aryan, could be so emotional like a non-Aryan. He instigated the 
latter to fight by saying that leaving the battle would cause him vice. Leaving the 
battle by a warrior is supposed to be a vice for the kṣatriya in all Dharmaśāstra-s. 
Kṛṣṇa was, perhaps, referring to that. This, however, couldn’t solve Arjuna’s worries. 
For one is not supposed to refute an adverse criticism with the help of the theses 
under scrutiny or by referring to the texts whose validity is the point at issue. Such 
solutions are considered to be suffering from the fallacy of being question-begging 
(sādhyasama-doṣa). We would see that the main strategy of the philosophy of the 
Gītā is that of persuasion rather than argumentation. The text is a gem of the art of 
persuasion and a literary work of equal merit. 
Arjuna’s view appears to be more congruent with the mainstream Indian 
approach to ethics. The Indian ethicists never took the ethical agent in isolation in 
judging her conduct. Arguably, situatedness runs through the entire Indian 
philosophy. It is for the first time in the history of Dharmaśāstra-s that the Gītā 
advocates detachment for a non-ascetic, a move that made Arjuna all the more 
perplexed. The Dharmaśāstra-s, a group of texts to which the Gītā belongs, clearly 
give us the impression that when it comes to the relation between the individual and 
the society, they clearly side with the latter. There is no scope for individualism and 
deontologism. Individual life, as we have already pointed out at the outset, is meant 
for and is directed towards the betterment of the society. The teleological or 
consequentialist underpinning of the prevalent views can easily be discerned in the 
texts. The ethical merit or demerit of an act depends on its conduciveness to the 
societal goal. No act can be considered to be ethically good by itself. Righteousness 
of an act depends on the end that it is directed to or the goal it seeks to attain. The 
Gītā, on the other hand, maintains that the ethical merit of an action is intrinsic to it. 
This, in turn, is justified by divine origin of the duties promoting those acts. Kṛṣṇa 
advised Arjuna to follow the path of action (karma) done not for attaining any 
personal goal. Arjuna’s arguments bring forth the inbuilt contradiction in Indian 
ethics—absolute autonomy of the self and its situatedness cannot go together. The 
poverty of the main line of argument of the text lays bare in the inarticulate questions 
raised by mumbling Arjuna.  
However, this was a later revelation in the story. When Arjuna presented his 
arguments, he seemed to have no idea as to what Kṛṣṇa had in his mind and what type 
of theory of ethics he was going to uphold to refute the former’s arguments. So, it 
would be ludicrous to claim that Arjuna was refuting deontologism, though his 
arguments went against it. His arguments rather stemmed from the mainstream Indian 
approach to ethics. 
Arjuna further urged that he couldn’t be happy killing his friends and relatives. It 
is noticeable that though he argued in favor of avoiding homicide in war, yet his 
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emphasis was clearly on not killing his own people, his near and dear ones. He further 
wondered how he could be happy in life by killing his own people.
4
 Apparently, he 
found no reason for fighting the battle, other than personal greed for enjoying the 
kingdom. This first argument can be understood better from a theoretical perspective 
of a conflict of ethics of a related and caring self with the ethics of a pure detached 
self. Most of the arguments that he presented subsequently stemmed from his 
practical concern, vis-à-vis moral concern, for the society he lived in. He was 
concerned about the extinction of family decent and was also worried about the 
treachery to his friends involved in the imminent war. He further mentioned that by 
destroying the families he would be destroying the traditional values maintained and 
nurtured through the family system and that destruction of those values would result 
in a surge of immorality into the society (Bhagavdgītā, 1/40-41). 
Apparently, the last one is a moral argument, as Arjuna was arguing that fighting 
the battle would cause in a total rout of morality from the society. How far the 
arguments provided by Arjuna were moral in nature is an issue of constant debate. 
Commentators like Shri Girindra Shekhar Basu take much pain to show that none of 
Arjuna’s arguments were moral in nature.5 He further claims that the arguments that 
Arjuna provided were solely a way of  self-deception on the part of Arjuna, who 
either wedged the war due to personal greed without ever contemplating upon its 
consequences, or got anguished at the thought that he would have to kill his beloved 
ones. Aujuna repeatedly used the words “dharma” and “adharma” while in his 
arguments. Basu opines
6
 that these terms stand for social good and social evil 
respectively and do not have any moral connotation. I don’t see why this should be 
so, while Arjuna repeatedly used the terms like “dharma,” “adharma,” “śreyo” and 
“pāpa” in his arguments. It is true that the terms “dharma,” and “adharma,” are often 
used, in Sanskrit, to respectively stand for a social duty or that, which leads to social 
good and  a social obligation for refraining from doing something that leads to social 
evil. However, the terms “śreyo” and “pāpa” do hardly have any such social 
connotation. Furthermore, at the end of his argument Arjuna urged, “…I’m confused 
about what is morally good (dharma-saṁmuḍha-cetā)…guide me” (Bhagavdgītā, 
2/11). If we interpret ‘dharma’ in this statement as social good or social duty, then we 
would have to claim that Kṛṣṇa’s advices, at best, contained nothing that pertained to 
morality, or at worst, were totally irrelevant. The first alternative does not seem to be 
acceptable to any orthodox Hindu, who thinks his moral life draws heavily on the 
teaching of the Gītā. A charitable reading of the text must grant at least as much to 
Kṛṣṇa as to admit that his speeches contained something pertaining to morality. The 
second alternative is equally unacceptable. It is hard to believe that Kṛṣṇa, whose self-
proclaimed omniscience was virtually endorsed by Arjuna, did not have a sense of 
relevance. If the latter did not put any moral question to him, and yet he started 
preaching Arjuna morality while in a battlefield, then surely he lacked a sense of 
relevance. Basu, however, does not address this issue.  
                                                 
4Swanjanaṁ hi kathaṁ hatvā sukhinah syān mādhava/ Bhagavdgītā, 1/39. 
5Basu, Shri Girindra Shekhar, Bhagavadgītā, p. 27. 
6Ibid. 
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It may be argued that though such words as “śreyo” and “pāpa” do not have any 
direct social connotation, yet they imply some social aspect of human life, since all 
aspects, including the moral aspects, of human life are ultimately related with the 
society such beings live in. Having said this, the objector has already distracted from 
her main contention that Arjuna’s arguments did not have any moral dimension. 
Besides, rather than refuting the thesis of the present paper, in a way it supports one 
of the claims made in this paper, that is, the Hindu ethics was developed the backdrop 
of the unquestionable presupposition that the traditional Hindu society as described in 
the sacred texts is a (morally) just society.
7
  
The main stake of Arjuna’s argument was that fighting the battle would result 
into the destruction of the existing social order. This and several other similar 
instances in the Gītā can be cited in support of the hypothesis mentioned above. 
Arjuna further mentioned that the annihilation of the societal values would make the 
women of the society corrupt, which in its turn, would result in a hybridization of the 
castes of that highly stratified society. He mentioned that such acts, as wedging a war, 
would have a cumulative effect on the society destroying the traditional values and 
the societal order by producing mixed castes, resulting in a total rout of the practice of 
performing sacrifices for one’s ancestors. These things would suffice to lead an 
individual to hell. 
If we consider Kṛṣṇa’s speeches that he delivered for Arjuna, after the latter 
submitted to him, as a disciple submits to an Indian seer, or a devotee submits to her 
guru, we will find that the former endorsed the path of persuasion rather than 
argumentation. As soon as Arjuna submitted to him, accepted him as his guru and 
sought his advice,
8
 he started rebuking Arjuna, calling him a pedantic.  Kṛṣṇa’s initial 
reaction to Arjuna’s predicament had two reasons in its favour. First, he didn’t 
consider these people deserved any pity. Secondly, Arjuna was reminded that wise 
men wouldn’t think like him—the wise would not lament for those who were living, 
nor would he lament for those who passed away (Bhagavdgītā, 2/11). Arjuna was also 
rebuked for having compassion, for those who didn’t deserve it (Ibid) The second was 
a more general objection than the first one. Not only had these people, who, according 
to Kṛṣṇa, had chosen the path of vice (adharma), deserved no compassion, but 
nobody in general deserved to have compassion of others. For, life and death of a 
person were supposed to be predetermined in accordance with the law of karma. 
Kṛṣṇa’s persuasive mood becomes all the more clear if we consider that earlier he 
reprimanded Arjuna for the latter’s “unmanliness” (klaibyam) caused by his emotions 
that were characteristic only of the non-Aryans. Kṛṣṇa contended that such petty 
                                                 
7The two crucial terms in this statement are ‘unquestionable’ and ‘just.’ I won’t say anything 
about the former. I think B. R. Ambedkar has said enough on the unquestionable nature of 
Hindu sacred texts. (See B. R. Ambedkar’s Annihilation of Caste, Chapter XXI, many 
editions). The presupposition that such a society is a justice-based society can be easily 
discerned throughout what is called Hindu ethics from the fact that any action that seemed to be 
in discord with its norms established by the sacred texts were considered to be immoral. 
8 Yacchreyaḥ syānniścitaṁ brūhi tanme śisyaste’haṁ śādhi māṁ tvāṁ prapannam/ 
Bhagavdgītā, 2/7. 
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emotions didn’t suit Arjuna, who was rather known for his ability of inflicting pain 
upon his enemies. Kṛṣṇa even presented arguments, the validity of which he himself 
didn’t accept. Kṛṣṇa argued that Arjuna’s emotions would not lead him to heaven. 
This has a strong flavour of consequentialism, which goes against the basic 
contention of the Gītā. If we follow Kṛṣṇa’s main line of argumentation, then we 
readily see that he left no stones unturned for rejecting consequentialism in favour of 
deontologism.  This shows that he had only one agendum in mind, that is, instigating 
Arjuna into fight.  
The general philosophical stance that the Gītā takes is that of deontologism. 
Kṛṣṇa’s severe criticism of the consequentialism underlying the Vadic ritualism 
shows his allegiance to deontologism. But while refuting Arjuna’s arguments he 
relied on consequentialism on several occasions. For, he had to convince Arjuna by 
hook or by crook. The jargon of consequentialism was known to Arjuna. So, Kṛṣṇa 
found it easier to convince Arjuna in terms of that jargon. Kṛṣṇa claimed that he was 
God and that if a person would think about him at the time of his death, since his 
mind would always concentrate on God, he would become identical with him [God] 
(Bhagavdgītā, 8/6). Arjuna was, therefore, asked to always remember him, and fight 
the battle (Bhagavdgītā, 8/7). Kṛṣṇa realized that Arjuna was enjoying his long 
metaphysical speech (Bhagavdgītā, 10/1) even though they were in a battlefield. He, 
however, was not sure whether Arjuna was convinced by it. He left no stones 
unturned to persuade Arjuna in the war. Finally, he made an emotional appeal, ‘If 
[after listening to all that I have said] you are still unable to follow them, then at least 
do it for my sake; you will get success.’9 However, apart from its emotional appeal, 
this statement has a devotional aspect, which lies beyond the scope of the present 
discussion. What is pertinent for the present purpose is that in order to bring home his 
point, Kṛṣṇa relied on consequentialism in this instance as well. 
In Chapter IX Kṛṣṇa described a cosmology, according to which everything that 
happens or exists in this world, was caused by him. He (Kṛṣṇa) is the root cause of 
what there is. However, his premises were not supported by arguments. Neither were 
they supposed to depend on any argument. He relied upon persuasion rather than 
argumentation, as he knew it well that persuasion was often more effective than 
argumentation. But Arjuna had to be persuaded, since he had already accepted Kṛṣṇa 
as his mentor and had surrendered to the latter unconditionally. In Chapter X Arjuna 
accepted everything that Kṛṣṇa said so far.10 In the light of this complete submission 
of Arjuna Kṛṣṇa made the appeal mentioned above.  
What the present argument shows is that Kṛṣṇa’s long speeches had great 
persuasive force, which could take the bereaved Arjuna under its spell, though the 
arguments that he provided missed out Arjuna’s main contention, i.e. a sense of care 
arising out of the concept of a related self. The ethics of the Gītā starts where reason 
submits to persuasion, indoctrination supersedes ratiocination, personal liberty 
subsumes under social wellbeing following the parameters set by the sacred texts and 
                                                 
9Abhyāse’pysamartho’si matkarmaparamo bhava/ 
Madarthamapi karmāṇi kurvan siddhimavāpsyasi// Bhagavdgītā, 12/10. 
10Sarvam etad ṛtaṁ manye yanmām vadasi keśava/ Bhagavdgītā, 10/14. 
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customs including scriptural injunctions act as the sole guiding force of the individual 
life. It is perfectly in accordance with the mainstream classical Indian ethics, for 
which human life has a purpose to serve in the design of things and is subsumed 
under the social order. The type of autonomy of thought that was exemplified in 
“Arjuna-Visāda-Yoga” has no scope in Hindu ethics, since Hindu ethics is a 
Prasthāna-Mīmāṁsā, a mode of discourse with prior commitment. 
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